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Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for
the Poor?
By ALLEN REDLICH*
But winds change; they always have, and doubtless they always
will .... The way I want to see thought reformed is by our ceasing
to view the elimination of poverty as a sentimental matter, as a
matter of compassion, and our starting to look on it as a matter of
justice, of constitutional right.'
Charles L. Black, Jr.
Until the creation of the Legal Services Program2 in 1965, the poor
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. I would like to acknowledge the efforts of my
colleagues Stephen Gottlieb, Katheryn Katz, Alex Seita, Bernard Harvith, Patrick Borchers,
and Serena Stier whose comments on early drafts were time consuming and helpful; the special
efforts of Stephen Wasby who both read the draft and gave me invaluable advice; the efforts of
my research assistant Gina Campano; and also the fiscal assistance and other support provided
by the Law School. And finally, I would like to acknowledge the emotional support of a class
of 75 students who took a course in Law and the Disadvantaged and whose enthusiasm
washed away my despair.
The views expressed here derive from my experiences in a legal services program that
litigated welfare cases with intensity. See James J. Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Wel-
fare Administration, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 836, 872-74, 877-89 (1968). It was a program
designed to provide service to the community, but issues of constitutional dimension arose and
were litigated. I confess a continued reluctance to classify cases as "service" or "law reform,"
and continue to believe that the client's interests, not society's or mine, should dictate whether
or not litigation should be instituted.
1. Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood,
Address Before the Columbia University Law School (Mar. 20, 1986), in 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1103, 1115 (1986).
2. The major contemporary writings dealing with the early years of the Legal Services
Program and the related legal problems of the poor include PATRICIA WALD, LAW AND POV-
ERTY (1965); EARL JOHNSON JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE
OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974) [hereinafter JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM]; THE
LAW OF THE POOR (Jacobus tenBroek ed., 1966); EMORY BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE
UNITED STATES (1951 & Supp. 1961); JAMES E. CARLIN, JAN HOWARD & SHELDON C.
MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1966) [hereinafter CARLIN, CIVIL JUSTICE]; JUS-
TICE AND THE LAW IN THE MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH EXPERIENCE (Harold H. Weisman
ed., 1966); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Jerome E. Carlin &
Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REv. 381 (1965); Edgar S.
Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964)
[hereinafter Cahn & Cahn, War on Poverty]; A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the
Antipoverty Program, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211 (1966) [hereinafter Pye, Role of Legal
Services]; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 699
(1969); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Michael J. Waggoner, Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The
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had very few lawyers and none with the resources to engage in the appel-
late process where constitutional doctrine is fashioned. As a result,
among the unfulfilled legal needs of the poor were several issues of con-
stitutional dimension, such as the existing right to due process,3 the right
to privacy,4 and the necessity of establishing rights to subsistence, to ade-
quate housing, and to an education. These issues were brought before
the Supreme Court during the first "war against poverty" by legal serv-
New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. R v. 805 (1967) [hereinafter Neighbor-
hood Law Offices]; Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970);
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971);
Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 UCLA L. REv. 361 (1965);
Justine Wise Poller, Problems Involving Family and Child, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 305 (1966);
James J. Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 836
(1968); Carol R. Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to
Limit Caseload, 46 J. URn. L. 217 (1969) [hereinafter Silver, Imminent Failure of Legal Serv-
ices for the Poor].
After the initial years, literature critiquing the performance of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) lawyers, or addressing current problems include SusAN LAWRENCE, THE
POOR IN COURT (1990); Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to
Welfare: A Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 MIN. L. REv. 211 (1973)
[hereinafter Krislov, Judicial Process]; Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid
Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. RPv. 474 (1985); Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for
the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REv. 282 (1982); Robert C. Cramton, Promise
and Reality in Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670 (1976); Elizabeth Hollingsworth, Ten
Years of Legal Services for the Poor, in A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS:
ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES AND LESSONS 285 (Robert H. Haveman ed., 1977); Gary Bellow,
Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106
(1977); Gary Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE Rnv. 337 (1980);
Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in
Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978).
3. Professor Law relates her experiences while working for Mobilization for Youth,
sponsor of a New York City legal services program:
In 1966, few administrators in the Department of Social Services knew that re-
cipients had a "right" to a hearing when aid was denied. By 1967 we had educated
the Department to the fact that they had to schedule a hearing. I would get all my
"fancy" proof in order. Then, most of the time, at the last minute, the recipient
would drop her claim because her case worker told her that if she went to the hear-
ing, her grant would be terminated.... Not only did poor people have no process in
the 1960's, but in a fundamental sense, they had no law.
Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L. REv.
805, 806 (1990).
I have termed the right to due process as an existing right, not one that resulted from
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Professor Law agrees, stating: "No one, except for
Justice Black in dissent, disputed the assertion that the eligible individual's interest in contin-
ued receipt of welfare constituted a form of property that triggered the need for due process
scrutiny." Law, supra, at 809.
4. See Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Is-
sues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1254 (1965); Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the
Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
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ices lawyers who at first achieved substantial successes,' but soon thereaf-
ter suffered bruising defeats.6
The time will come, as Professor Black predicts, 7 when there will be
attempts to relitigate the constitutional battles that were lost twenty
years ago. Of course, the attempts will fail if Bork,' Epstein,9 and Win-
ter"0 correctly view the Constitution. The present composition of the
Supreme Court gives no reason to believe otherwise. But poverty erodes
the nation, and one day we will realize that we pay a dear price for our
Elizabethan era treatment of the poor.11 Hopefully, Professor Chayes's
suggestion that the prohibitions expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment
5. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional certain statutes
that conditioned eligibility for welfare benefits on a year's residence within the jurisdiction);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process required that
welfare benefits could not be terminated prior to the holding of a hearing); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth. of Durham, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (holding that tenants in public housing projects could
not be evicted without notice of the reasons thereof and an opportunity to respond); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that access to the courts could not be denied to
indigent women who sought dissolution of their marriages and lacked funds to pay certain
costs).
6. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding allocation of welfare resources a
matter of state concern and refusing to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to state actions
challenged as denying equal protection to welfare recipients); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (upholding state eviction procedures against due process attacks); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (declining to hold school financing scheme that
resulted in disparate educational opportunities violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
7. Black, supra note 1, at 1115.
8. Robert Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in The Constitution, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 695.
9. Richard A. Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for Welfare Rights, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV.
201.
10. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41. Winter's essay begins as a tight, tough refutation of Professor Frank
Michelman's Rawlsian perspective before the feared ascent into economic equations. Id. at 75.
He mentions "legal services" as among those that might better be distributed, not in the provi-
sion of the service, but by monetary transfer with the freedom to choose or not choose the
service. Of course, the question of whether this would benefit the poor could be answered by
cases like Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), which resulted in a judgment worth billions
of dollars. See More Poor Children Eligible for Disability Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991,
at A8; Spencer Rich, Freeing Aid to Disabled Youngsters" New Rules May Help Tens of
Thousands, WAH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1990, at A9. Rawls and Michelman might point out that
the lack of any criticism of the Court's decision or concern over the cost of compliance sup-
ports the position that there are societal "notions of justice in distributive shares."
11. See 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601); Bernard L. Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psycho-
analytic Speculations Concerning Welfare and Punitive Sanctions, in TmHE LAW OF THE POOR,
supra note 2, at 33, 43, (stating some twenty-five years ago: "We, as a nation, are strong
enough in our economic and social development to permit us to relinquish our ambivalent
attitudes toward the recipients of our welfare aid.... Our national ego is strong, and we can
afford to give up our social neuroses.").
See also Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Develop-
ment and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964); GILBERT STEINER, SOCIAL INSECU-
Smring 19921
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have a "positive spin" 2 will eventually prevail. Professors Michelman, 3
Edelman, 14 and others s set forth legitimate legal justification for consti-
tutional change, which should in due course be presented to the Court.
One would expect that when these issues are relitigated, legal serv-
ices lawyers, the paid lawyers for the poor, would do the litigating. In
the earlier days of legal services, its leaders, Edward Sparer,' 6 Harold
Rothwax,1 7 Gary Bellow," Jim Lorenz,' 9 and a host of others, were in
RITY (1966); Jacobus tenBroek & Richard B. Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-
A Normative Evaluation, 1 UCLA L. REv. 237, 264 (1954).
12. Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1026, 1037 (1988).
13. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969). Michelman suggests a
constitutional underpinning to some form of minimum subsistence, or "welfare rights" based
upon the premise that "deprivation can be a great evil, especially where the inequalities are
neither marginal in significance nor randomly distributed ... (becoming] gravely prejudicial to
one's chances for a decent life .. " Id. at 7. He then notes that the Court's "egalitarian"
interventions are "a vindication of a state's duty to protect against certain hazards which are
endemic in an unequal society, rather than vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in unequal
treatment." Id. at 9. See also Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare
Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962 (1973); Frank I.
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659.
14. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of the Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1987). Edelman's position is that the Constitution mandates "sur-
vival" income. He does not argue for a court-ordered end to "poverty." Id. at 3. He suggests
two alternate theories; first, that the doctrine has existed unrecognized in our constitutional
structure all along, an argument he suggests is substantive due process. Alternatively, he as-
serts that it derives from "the government's historic and continuing complicity in economic
arrangements that forseeably resulted in the current maldistribution," which he describes as
"equal protection." Id. at 5-6. He also presents the appalling economic facts concerning the
growing level of poverty in this most affluent of nations. Id. at 8-19.
15. In 1966 Albert M. Bendich wrote in Privacy, Poverty and the Constitution, in THE
LAW OF THE PooR, supra note 2, at 96-97:
The most fundamental needs are clearly for food, shelter, and clothing. To what
extent are they merely luxuries and to what extent are they not only biological and
social but also constitutional necessities?... Moreover, if the answer here is in the
affirmative and the state is under a constitutional obligation to provide persons with
housing, are there not some minimal requirements which must be adhered to so that
the right is meaningful?... [I]f the state must provide housing for those who would
otherwise be without shelter, it obviously need not be the governor's mansion, but it
must be minimally consistent with basic standards of health and decency.... If rat
infested, dilapidated, oppressive slum dwellings can produce disease, depression, and
other mental disorders and render privacy even in the sense of access to reasonable
seclusion meaningless, such dwellings do not constitute housing....
See C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of
Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983).
16. The Director of Mobilization for Youth's demonstration legal services project, the
founder of the Center on Social Policy and Law, and later Professor of Law at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School.
17. The successor to Sparer at Mobilization for Youth and now a New York State
Supreme Court judge.
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the thick of such constitutional litigation. But now, legal services are in a
sorry state. Legal services today have become staid and settled, con-
trolled in large part by the Legal Services Corporation, a public corpora-
tion20 that distributes funds to provide lawyers for the impoverished
throughout the land, including Guam and Micronesia. The Corpora-
tion's priority is to accumulate a large volume of "clients" and "cases."
It shows no interest in success or quality of representation.2' The typical
local program features low pay, constant turnover in staff, and an over-
whelming case load.22 Common sense and experience tells us that young
lawyers need leadership and direction to develop the skills and will to
undertake major litigation. But for the most part, leadership and direc-
tion are absent. As a result, litigation has become a lost art for almost all
legal services programs.23 The situation is most acute in our poverty
stricken major cities, where with a few exceptions, there has been virtu-
ally no reported federal litigation by legal services programs during the
last ten years.24 Perhaps two illustrations will suffice to make the point.
Legal services program in South Dakota, with 18 lawyers,25 have en-
gaged in far more reported federal court litigation since 1980 than the
legal services programs in Atlanta, Detroit, Birmingham, Houston, Los
Angeles, Miami, Memphis, New Orleans, or San Francisco.26 The sec-
ond illustration is that the clinics of Brooklyn Law School and New
York University Law School each engage in more federal court litigation
than the legal services programs of almost all our major cities.27
With legal services programs that are less and less capable of han-
dling litigation, today's dilemma is two-fold. First, the capacity to do
quality lawyering and litigating must be restored. Second, other avail-
18. Co-founder of the effective and controversial California Rural Legal Assistance Pro-
gram (CRLA), involved in the creation of the National Legal Service Program, and now a
Professor at Harvard Law School.
19. Co-founder and first Director of CRLA.
20. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961(1988)).
21. The Legal Services Corporation's massive 1988-1989 FAcT BOOK [hereinafter FACT
BOOK] never mentions either word. While it does segregate cases by category and has a cate-
gory called "litigated cases closed" into which it placed 230,889 cases in 1988, and states that
125,459 cases were closed after "court decision," by implication, all cases were of equal
importance.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 107-12.
23. See FACT BOOK, supra note 21, Table A.
24. Id.
25. Id at 52.
26. See id at p. 32.
27. Washington Square Legal Services, the New York University clinical program, has 43
reported appearances in federal courts since 1981. Brooklyn Law School's clinical program has
20 appearances in federal courts.
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able resources-this nation's larger law firms and its law schools-must
be utilized in an effective manner to provide support for the major litiga-
tions necessary to seek to eliminate systemic abuses and to achieve
change. This Article will propose that the American Bar Association
encourage and direct these activities.
Part I of this Article will briefly review the situation as it was before
the creation of the Legal Services Program, the program's beginnings,
and the many constitutional litigations undertaken during the first "war
against poverty." Part II will describe the events during the Nixon and
Reagan presidencies that led to the deterioration of the Legal Services
Program, and set forth data strongly suggesting that legal services pro-
grams are unable to handle constitutional litigations on behalf of the
poor. Finally, Part III will offer a variety of suggestions as to how the
existing situation can be improved.
I. The Rise of the Legal Services Program
A. The Origins and Development of the Legal Services Program
When the "war against poverty" began, the poor saw the law as a
part of the criminal justice system, as a hostile organ of government, or
as a tool used by the landlord or creditor. Lewis Powell, then President
of the American Bar Association, said: "Of... long-range importance is
the attitude of the poor towards the law. Many of them have come to
regard the law as an enemy."'28 What little organized civil legal represen-
tation the poor received came from legal aid societies that failed to pro-
vide meaningful services29 because of sparse resources and a charity-
oriented perspective30 that accepted and never challenged the systemic
practices that adversely affected the poor. A 1964 survey spoke of legal
aid attorneys with annual caseloads of 1678 cases. 31 The heavy caseload
28. Lewis S. Powell, Jr., The Response of the Bar, 51 A.B.A. J. 751, 752 (1965).
29. CARLIN, CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 50, describes the "services":
Three out of four accepted applicants for legal aid receive only a single brief consul-
tation; only a minimal amount of time is given to the investigation of fact, to legal
research and drafting of legal documents, and to court work. Many offices are inca-
pable of handling cases that require extensive investigation or time-consuming litiga-
tion. The situation is further aggravated by low salaries, high turnover in personnel
and inadequate direction.... There is little time or incentive to enter into a contest
over legal principle, to make or alter a law, or to combat institutionalized sources of
justice.
30. Community mores and the mores or interests of contributors to the society often dic-
tated both the types of cases handled by a legal aid society and the attitudes of its lawyers.
Clients of legal aid were recipients of charity, perceived and treated no differently at legal aid
than they were perceived and treated at the local welfare office. See Neighborhood Law Offices,
supra note 2, at 808-09; JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 2, at 50.
31. Pye, Role of Legal Services, supra note 2, at 213, states:
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meant there was no time to do research, to investigate the facts, or to
litigate.32 At best, the legal aid lawyer could rush to the courthouse to
delay an eviction. Even this tiny bit of defensive litigation would disap-
point a waiting room filled with others in need.
In 1964, Charles Reich published The New Property,33 noting the
growth of government grants of "largesse," such as licenses, subsidies,
contracts and income maintenance expenditures, and government condi-
tioning of these grants,34 sometimes on a waiver of the grantee's constitu-
tional rights.3 5 Reich suggested that government "largesse" had become
so important to the social order36 that it deserved the procedural and
substantive protection afforded to the holders of property rights.3 7 This
perspective, namely that one has a right to largesse, became the bedrock
of the litigations that would be brought in the late 1960s and early 1970s
on behalf of the poor. Shortly before Reich's article was published, dem-
onstration projects had begun in New York City,3" New Haven,39 and
Washington,"° where lawyers were assigned to social agencies to assist
the agencies' clients. The New York City program was operated by a
social agency called Mobilization for Youth, located in the mostly Puerto
Rican slums of New York City. This program was the most publicized
of these projects due to the talents of its director, Edward V. Sparer, who
would soon become the "war's" most respected spokesman and strate-
gist.41 At this time, Edgar and Jean Cahn published another seminal
In thirty-three offices the average caseload per full time attorney was 1678 new cases
each year. Twelve other offices had average caseloads of 1090 cases. Only twenty-
five of seventy offices reporting had caseloads of less that 1000 cases each year. The
average salaries for professional personnel were well below the levels of government,
business or private practice.
32. See CARLIN, CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 50; Neighborhood Law Offices, supra
note 2, at 807, and Silver, Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor, supra note 2, for a
thorough discussion of the caseload problem.
33. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For some of the other
seminal works in this area see Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Pivilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); John D. French, Comment, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234, 236-37 (1961); and Harry W. Jones, The Rule
of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154-55 (1958).
34. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739-40, 756-57 (1964).
35. Id. at 760-64.
36. Id at 774-79.
37. Id. at 779-86.
38. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 2, at 23.
39. Id. at 25-26.
40. Id. at 27-32. The beginnings of the Washington program are described in Pye, Role of
Legal Services, supra note 2, at 231-37.
41. Professor Sylvia Law, who worked with Sparer at Mobilization for Youth, at the Co-
lumbia Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, and at the University of Pennsylvania Law
Spring 19921
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article, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective,42 which advocated
establishment of neighborhood law firms to represent poor communities
"with an eye toward making public officials, private service agencies, and
local business interests more responsive to the need and grievances of the
neighborhood."43 The congruence of Reich's theory of entitlement,
Sparer's success, the Calms' call for "neighborhood law offices," and
President Johnson's "war against poverty" resulted in a call for federally
funded legal services for the poor. A memorable Law Day speech by
Attorney General Robert Kennedy at the University of Chicago Law
School,' a series of conferences on the subject,45 and the support of the
prestigious American Bar Association,46 led to a decision by the newly
created Office of Economic Opportunity to establish and fund a Legal
Services Program.47
By September of 1966, the handful of pre-existing legal aid offices
had been augmented by hundreds of federally funded offices staffed by
more than a thousand lawyers, with more to come.48 The national staff
of the Legal Services Program (LSP) and its advisory committee quickly
adopted "law reform" as its principal goal. Legal services programs
were, in the course of serving clients, to use the law to achieve social
change.49 They did so with a passion. Hundreds of major litigations
began and flourished. One student of the subject, Susan E. Lawrence,
concluded, "During its nine-year tenure, 1965 through 1974, the LSP
sponsored 164 cases before the Supreme Court, 119 of which were ac-
cepted for review. The eighty LSP cases that received plenary considera-
tion represent 7 percent of all written opinions handed down during this
era."
50
School, states that Sparer "set the agenda for welfare rights advocacy for the next decade."
Sylvia A. Law, In Memoriam Edward V Sparer, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 425 (1984).
42. Edgar Cahn & Jean Calm, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317 (1964).
43. Id. at 1334.
44. Address Before the University of Chicago Law School (May 1, 1964), in Calm &
Cahn, War on Poverty, supra note 2, at 1336-37.
45. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE POOR (1964) (Proceedings of Conference on the Extension of Legal Services
to the Poor, Nov. 12-14, 1964, Washington, D.C.); PATRICIA WALD, LAW AND POVERTY
(1965) (National Conference on Law and Poverty, June 23-25, 1965, Washington D.C.).
46. See JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 2, at 49-64.
47. Essentially, the program began with the appointment of a director on September 24,
1965. See id. at 66-69.
48. See Neighborhood Law Offices, supra note 2, at 806.
49. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 132-34.
50. SUSAN LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT 9 (1991).
[Vol. 19:745
B. The Constitutional Litigations
The literature discussing the major constitutional litigations insti-
tuted by legal services lawyers generally discusses only the leading cases,
Shapiro v. Thompson,51 Goldberg v. Kelly,52 Lindsey v Normet,53 Dan-
dridge v Williams, 14 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,55 and Wyman v. James.56 This approach tends to overlook other
related constitutional issues raised by legal services lawyers. For exam-
ple, in addition to deciding Shapiro v. Thompson on equal protection
grounds, the Court utilized equal protection on other occasions. In
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,57 the Court invali-
dated a provision of the Food Stamp Act that denied "unrelated" mem-
bers of households access to the program. In Graham v. Richardson,58
aliens were protected against state welfare statutes that subjected them to
durational residency tests. James v. Strange9 precluded states from at-
tempts to recover the costs of legal defenses provided indigents. Jimenez
v. Weinberger' invalidated a statutory provision that denied Social Se-
curity disability benefits to certain categories of illegitimate children. In
Pease v. Hansen,6" recipients of non-categorical assistance, or "poor re-
lief," were afforded the same constitutional protections as recipients of
federally funded welfare. In Williams v. Illinois,6 2 the Court used equal
protection to limit the length of imprisonment for involuntary nonpay-
ment of fines.
In the area of due process, Justice Brennan held in Goldberg v.
Kelly63 that welfare benefits could not be terminated unless the recipient
first was offered a hearing satisfactory to the essential elements of due
51. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional certain statutes that conditioned eligi-
bility for welfare benefits on one year residence within the jurisdiction).
52. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process required that welfare bene-
fits could not be terminated prior to the holding of a hearing).
53. 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (upholding state eviction procedures against due process attacks).
54. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding allocation of welfare resources a matter of state concern
and refusing to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to state actions challenged as denying
equal protection to welfare recipients).
55. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (declining to hold school financing scheme that resulted in disparate
educational opportunities violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
56. 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding the conditioning of welfare benefits on consenting to
home visits by caseworkers by appointment within normal working hours not violative of
Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches).
57. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
58. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
59. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
60. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
61. 404 U.S. 70 (1971).
62. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
63. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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process.64 He reasoned that without a continuation of benefits, the recip-
ient would not survive, survival was necessary for a meaningful hearing,
and due process thus mandated that the hearing precede the termina-
tion.65 The Court also invoked due process on other occasions. Fuentes
v. Shevin66 invalidated a state prejudgment replevin statute. Goss v. Lo-
pez67 gave a modicum of process to public school students threatened
with suspension. O'Connor v. Donaldson6" upheld the due process rights
of persons improperly committed to state mental institutions. Stanley v.
Illinois69 upheld the due process rights of natural fathers threatened with
loss of custody of their children. The Court also invalidated a number of
state statutes that conflicted with federal law, asserting that the state laws
were preempted, sometimes relying on the Supremacy Clause.7'
The Court also acted in the area of access to justice. In Boddie v.
Connecticut,71 the Court held a destitute woman need not pay publica-
tion costs as a prerequisite to divorcing her missing spouse. But the
Court refused to go farther, holding in United States v. Kras72 that bank-
ruptcy filing fees must be paid, even by the indigent; and in Ortwein v.
Schwab,73 the Court held an appeal from a welfare department decision
could be conditioned on payment of the court's filing fee.
The Court refused to use equal protection in many instances. More
precisely, the Court applied the rational or reasonable basis74 test to state
actions or inactions. In Dandridge v. Williams,75 the Court held states
could "cap" welfare grants, which in effect meant each child in a large
family would receive less than a child in a smaller family. The Court
accepted the state's argument that the cap provided a work incentive,76
because welfare allotments higher than one could earn working at the
64. Id. at 266.
65. Id. at 264.
66. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
67. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
68. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
69. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
70. Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (per
curiam); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd.,
409 U.S. 413 (1973); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
71. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
72. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
73. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
74. Posner's antitrust argument that applying the "Rule of Reason" rather than the per se
rule was "little more than a euphemism for nonliability" seems appropriate here. Richard
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach. Reflections on the "Sylvania" Deci-
sion, 45 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 1, 14 (1977).
75. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
76. Id. at 486-87.
minimum wage were a disincentive to work. The Court announced, in
the best tradition of Pontius Pilate, that allocation of state resources in
the area of public assistance was not a matter of judicial concern. 7 The
Court also threw up its hands at the thought of involvement in school
financing, stating there was no constitutional right to a public school ed-
ucation.71 In Lindsey v. Nonnet,79 the Court declined future involve-
ment with housing.
Dandridge shattered the hopes of those who thought social change
could quickly be achieved in the courts. The decision came at a moment
when everything seemed to be going particularly well. In the spring of
1969, the State of New York had enacted a statute that sharply reduced
welfare benefits. Rosado v. Wyman,"0 a major, complex challenge to the
state plan, was quickly commenced. Months later, Rothstein v. Wyman8 l
was instituted, as an afterthought, when Rosado floundered. 82 While
77. Id. at 486.
78. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
79. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
80. 304 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397
(1970).
81. Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
82. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), was instituted after New York enacted legis-
lation slashing welfare grants and costs. The statute cut grants for suburban residents of New
York City more than for city residents. Rosado presented a double-barreled challenge to the
state legislation. The major attack was that the state scheme was in direct conflict with section
402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, which mandated that the states adjust their standards of
need "to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established."
The second claim was that the lower benefits provided Nassau County plaintiffs denied
them equal protection. Joinder was necessary because at the time the federal question jurisdic-
tional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, required that the matter in controversy be in excess of
$10,000 and the decision in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), prevented aggregation of
claims, thus presenting a scenario whereby no federal court could obtain jurisdiction to decide
a case involving the interpretation of a federal statute that involved the expenditure of hun-
dreds of millions of federal dollars. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) provided jurisdiction
where under color of state law a plaintiff would be deprived of a constitutional right, a solid
jurisdictional basis for the claim of the Nassau plaintiffs. By joining the two claims, the attack
based on non-compliance with the Social Security Act could be decided by the Court under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
The case was fast moving and complex. A chronology of court actions during the litigation is
provided infra note 174. Suffice it to say, that at a low point a strategy meeting was held at the
Columbia Law School with about 40 to 50 attenders, including attorneys from Texas and
Louisiana (who were conducting similar litigation), Lee Albert, Paul Dodyck (author of the
first Poverty Law casebook), Edward Sparer, Norman Dorsen, and Hal Rothwax. To the best
of my recollection, Sylvia Law, Carl Rachlin, David Diamond, Cesar Perales, and Mort Cohen
were also present. All of 30 seconds time was devoted to the question of my Nassau clients'
plight and it was agreed that I begin an action on their behalf with the assistance of the Center
on Social Policy and Law.
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Rosado, the carefully planned litigation, 3 sat on a Supreme Court
docket, a three-judge district court in Rothstein held that the state's dis-
parate treatment of residents of New York's suburbs violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Rejecting the state's
assertion that the "higher social cost of living" in New York City"5 justi-
fied the differential, the Court stated:
Receipt of welfare benefits may not at the present time constitute
the exercise of a constitutional right. But among our Constitu-
tion's expressed purposes was the desire to "insure domestic tran-
quility" and "promote the general Welfare." Implicit in those
phrases are certain basic concepts of humanity and decency. One
of these, voiced as a goal in recent years by most responsible gov-
ernmental leaders, both federal and state, is the desire to insure
that indigent, unemployable citizens will at least have the bare
minimums required for existence, without which our expressed
fundamental constitutional rights and liberties frequently cannot
be exercised and therefore become meaningless.... It can hardly
be doubted that the subsistence level of our indigent and unem-
ployable aged, blind and disabled involves a more crucial aspect of
life and liberty than the right to operate a business on Sunday or to
extract gas from subsoil. We believe that with the stakes so high in
terms of human misery the equal protection standard to be applied
should be stricter than that used upon review of commercial legis-
lation and more nearly approximate that applied to laws affecting
fundamental constitutional rights.8 6
Sparer's strategy 7 had envisioned attacks on substantive and proce-
83. Stephen L. Wasby, How Planned is "Planned Litigation," 83 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.
83 (1984).
84. Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
85. Id. at 348-49. The Court said:
At first blush there might appear to be something to the proposition that the plight of
the welfare recipient living in grim and dismal quarters in a New York City ghetto is
so miserable and frustrating that he is led to make greater use of parks, beaches,
museums, recreational and cultural centers than is the recipient in the City's subur-
ban counties, particularly since these facilities are within easier reach in New York
City ....
... We question whether the aged, blind and disabled are able, in view of their
physical handicaps, to make any appreciable use of many of the facilities described
by the defendant, such as beaches and museums .... [D]efendant erroneously
assumes that welfare recipients in the suburban counties live in more pleasant and
less frustrating surroundings than those in New York City. The picture of suburban
welfare recipients living in garden apartments (the term used on [sic] oral argument),
located on the edge of a park, is an unreal one. It ignores the existence of many
rundown tenements in the slum districts of our surrounding suburban counties,
which unfortunately provide the principal housing facilities for welfare recipients.
86. Id. at 346-47.
87. See Jack Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in De-
mocracy, 29 REC. 320, 335-38 (1974); Krislov, Judicial Process, supra note 2, at 223-34. It was
personally described to me by Edward Sparer in the early 1970s. I suspect it was less of a
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dural flaws in state welfare programs, followed by challenges to the ade-
quacy of state-wide benefit levels, implicitly based on a constitutional
right to subsistence. Finally having achieved those goals, the poor would
demand a national welfare system or, at the very least, a national stan-
dard of benefits. State welfare systems had already been battered by
thousands of cases. The constitutional challenge to the level of benefits
provided by particular states had arrived swiftly, but just as swiftly was
resolved by the Court in Dandridge; the battle, but not the war, was over.
H. The Demise of the Legal Services Program
A. The Nixon and Reagan Years
President Nixon, on taking office, began a lengthy multi-faceted war
of attrition aimed at legal services. Nixon's appointed Director of the
Office of Economic Opportunity frequently attacked the program and its
personnel"8 in concert with numerous other administration officials and
supporters led by his Vice-President. 9 Attacks by state officials directed
at various local programs, such as the attack on California Rural Legal
Assistance (CRLA) by then-Governor Reagan and other California offi-
cials, were only grudgingly rebuffed,90 as internal attacks on the program
continued.91 After a few years, the administration and the program's
supporters, recognizing neither side could win the battle,92 agreed to "de-
politicize" legal services by setting up a public corporation to be funded
by the federal government.93 After a three-year political battle over the
details, the Legal Services Corporation Act was passed.94 The ravages of
inflation during the dispute over the terms of the Act, when the level of
program funding had been frozen,95 led to large decreases in the number
"plan" than a vision of what might have been. Certainly, the disjointed manner in which cases
were brought, each by attorneys whose primary goals were to achieve what they could for their
own clients, made planning an orchestrated sequence of cases impossible.
88. Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L.
REv. 681, 693-95 (1976) [hereinafter George, Development].
89. Id. at 694; Spiro Agnew, What's Wrong With the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A. J.
930 (1972).
90. See Jerome B. Falk & Stuart R. Pollak, Political Interference with Publicly Funded
Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy and the- Future of Legal Services, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 599
(1973) [hereinafter Falk & Pollak, CRLA].
91. See George, Development, supra note 88, at 689-90.
92. Id. at 690.
93. Id. at 690-91.
94. Id. at 695-96.
95. Id. at 699. Congress, expecting the imminent creation of the Corporation, funded
Legal Services Program through continuing resolutions at $71.5 million per year during what
turned out to be a four-year period. Id.
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of program offices96 and lawyers,97 massive attorney turnover,98 and a
decline in the availability and quality of necessary support services. 99
There was also a change in program goals. The Corporation now
spoke of "equal access to justice," rather than of "achieving social
change.' '1°° The Corporation distributed its largesse based primarily on
the number of potential clients in a program's geographic area. One ob-
server, noting the new corporate language ("1l]ocal programmes became
'recipients'... clients became 'applicants' ... attorneys became employ-
ees"), commented that "the terminology changes reflected a subtle
bureaucratization or management orientation of the programme."' 01
The voluminous and incredibly detailed statistical reports compiled and
issued by the Corporation0 2 tell the reader nothing about the program's
accomplishments other than the number of cases handled and clients
served, evidencing its lack of concern about quality.
The Nixon experience was heavenly compared to co-existing with
President Reagan, who remembered his prior defeats in California. 103
His bare-knuckled attacks on CRLA while governor of California"'
were a predictor of his performance as President. The budgets he sub-
mitted to Congress never requested any funds for the Legal Services Cor-
poration, forcing its Congressional supporters to fight, year after year, to
96. Id.
97. Id. George, citing congressional hearings, states that the number of staff attorneys
dropped by about 13% during the battle and that 40% of neighborhood offices were closed.
He also asserts that other offices had to curtail services.
98. Id. George states that the salary gap led to a turnover of 40% per year since 1972.
99. Id. George states: "fixed funding for this extended period-one marked by high infla-
tion and increasing unemployment-reduced the quantity of service available to the poor,
threatened its quality, and produced an unacceptable level of lawyer turnover." He continues,
"[w]orking conditions in some programs-lack of privacy for client interviews or insufficient
funds for essential activity such as discovery-have failed to meet requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."
100. Alan W. Houseman, Community Group Action: Legal Services, Poor People and Com-
munity Groups, Special Issue, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., 392, 396 (Summer 1985), states: "The
LSC managers in 1984 attempted... to require programs to provide substantially equal access
to all clients in the programs' service areas, a position inconsistent with the goal of allocating
resources to address substantive goals and objectives."
101. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Aid in the United States: The Professionalization and
Politicization of Legal Services in the 1980's, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 29, 49 (1984).
102. FACT BOOK, supra note 21, published by the Corporation contains 419 pages com-
posed almost entirely of tables with an occasional graph. There are only eleven pages of text,
six of them containing definitions of terms used in the accumulated data.
103. Rivera v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (estab-
lishing agricultural workers' right to a minimum wage); Castro v. State, 466 P.2d 244 (Cal.
1970) (invalidating requirement that voters be literate in English); and Morris v. Williams, 433
P.2d 697 (Cal. 1967) (invalidating cutbacks in medical care for the poor).
104. See Falk & Pollak, CRLA, supra note 90.
secure enough funds for LSC's survival. One year the program's funds
were reduced by 25 percent.105 Salaries for legal services attorneys, al-
ready low, suffered in comparison with salaries earned by other attorneys
in both the public and private sectors.10 6 The decision by the Corpora-
tion to create programs in the South and Southwest '07 increased the
number of potential clients at the same time the disintegrating salaky
structure led to massive staff turnover.0 8
As early as 1977, Gary Bellow '0 9 commented that "despite their
commitment to avoid the kind of cautious, detached, client controlling
services that so many public bureaucracies-public housing authorities,
welfare departments-seem to provide... this is precisely the kind of
service our clients are receiving."110 Bellow listed typical traits of legal
service programs such as routine processing of cases, low client auton-
omy, narrow definitions of client concerns, and "inadequate" out-
comes.11 Bellow, seemingly echoing descriptions of mid-century legal
aid, noted:
105. FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 17.
106. See infra note 113.
107. See FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 17, detailing funding provided the several states
each year from 1976 to 1989. The additional funding for some states increased dramatically
between 1976 and 1977. Some examples:
1976 1977
Alabama 307,610 1,310,055
Arkansas 182,200 783,313
North Carolina 443,000 1,610,500
Oklahoma 500,255 915,214
South Carolina 469,000 1,112,041
Tennessee 756,100 1,660,378
Texas 2,608,363 4,912,871
Virginia 533,800 1,308,094
108. Id. States in other areas did not fare as well:
1976 1977
California 13,481,553 15,749,960
New York 9,928,167 11,485,872
Maine 605,857 677,269
Massachusetts 4,028,880 4,684,648
New Jersey 3,263,178 3,670,645
According to the Legal Services Corporation, 1000 of its lawyers, representing about one-third
of its staff attorneys, left in 1976. Legal Services Corporation, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT 11
(1977). In 1977, the Legal Services Corporation saw the same rate of departure and reported
that 80% of its staff attorneys stayed less than three years. Legal Services Corporation, 1977
ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1978). The FACT BOOK, supra, note 21, establishes that 1164 of the
2536 staff lawyers in the nation's legal services programs have less than three years experience.
109. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977).
110. Id. at 108.
111. Id.
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When one learns, from the limited empirical work available on
legal aid practice, that legal services attorneys are regularly han-
dling caseloads of one hundred and fifty ongoing cases, generally
seeing their clients only once in the course of an entire representa-
tion, and spending an average of twenty minutes per interview on
the client's substantive legal problems, it seems a certainty that the
cases are being superficially and minimally handled. 12
A law firm that staffed its litigation department with law school
graduates, paid them less than competing firms,113 trained them in a cur-
sory manner, did not expose them to the work habits and ethics of exper-
ienced litigators, and saw them leave after one or two years to be
replaced with a new group of graduates would have a short existence.
Unhappily, this is the manner in which most legal services programs
have operated during the past years.
B. Litigation and Its Relationship to Good Lawyering
Lack of involvement in litigation by legal services programs evi-
dences a failure to provide quality services to their clients. Most of the
cases that confront poverty lawyers require advice, referral, or other
non-litigative approaches. This is not to denigrate legal services lawyers
engaging in these activities or representing clients before administrative
tribunals or local courts.114 Many of the problems of the poor, however,
can be resolved only through litigation. 1 5 Others cannot be resolved in
112. Id. at 109.
113. The average salary for staff attorneys with less than one year experience in 1988 was
$19,995. FAcT BOOK, supra note 21, at 51. Studies of starting salaries of law school graduates
in 1986, two years earlier, show starting average salaries to be $31,517 or $32,997. Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, An Economic Analysis of the Market of Law Students, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 627, 631
(1989) (Ehrenberg notes that the starting salary for federal government lawyers who customa-
rily were hired at the GS-ll rank was $27,000 in 1986).
In New York, a law school graduate can enter the State Civil Service as an Attorney
Trainee I at a base salary of $28,533, with provision for an additional $1000 premium if in the
top third of his class and an automatic $701 salary differential if appointed to positions within
New York City or its suburbs, for a potential total compensation of $30,234. The salary levels
and titles are periodically increased so that two years after admission to the bar, one automati-
cally becomes a Senior Attorney, with a beginning base salary of $43,080 together with premi-
ums and salary differentials as noted above. (N.Y.S. Nos. 20211-20-21 1-Legal Specialties-
Legal Careers, N.Y.S. Dep't Civil Serv.).
On the legal services job market, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 58-63, 193-95 (1991), lists
law school graduate salaries ranging from $19,400 to $23,000.
114. See Allen Redlich, The Art of Welfare Advocacy: Available Procedures and Forums, 36
ALB. L. REv. 57 (1971) (listing the numerous alternatives available to legal services attorneys
and suggesting that they "use the variety of existing administrative and litigation pressures...
so as to enable the client to survive." Id. at 58.).
115. I am not speaking of "law reform," "impact litigation," "test cases," or class actions,
but of the problems facing the individual client who has intractable problems. Whether or not
litigation is the appropriate means to achieve social change has been the subject of discourse
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an appropriate manner without a credible threat of litigation. When liti-
gation is the appropriate option and it is not undertaken, the client is
effectively abandoned by the attorney. Even where there is complete dis-
closure of the litigation option and the client is told that it will not be
exercised, there is a betrayal because unlike a corporate client, the poor
cannot seek out other counsel. The need to litigate occurs when the ad-
versary is a government agency bound by statutes, rules, regulations, in-
terpretations, and policies that preclude an agency official from making a
reasonable attempt to settle a dispute, even when the official is not disin-
clined to do so." 6 Litigation is necessary when proceedings before ad-
ministrative agencies fail to resolve the client's problem in a just and
lawful manner." 7 The need to litigate also exists when the statute or
policy is itself unlawful." '1 Many problems of poor clients are either-or
situations where the client either loses or wins. Welfare eligibility is a
good example: It cannot be parsed. Litigation is also necessary when the
negotiation process fails to achieve a fair and just outcome. The poor
rarely have bargaining power1 9 matching that of the government and
other perennial adversaries of the poor. Since bargaining power dictates
the outcome of negotiations, the poor generally do not do well. 120
for a generation and will not be discussed here although the author would answer the question
in the affirmative. For the differing views, see Pye, Role of Legal Services, supra note 2;
JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 189-90 (1981); Wexler, supra note 2; Hazard,
Social Justice Through Civil Justice, supra note 2; Falk & Pollak, supra note 2, at 606 n. 14
(noting that only 8% of CRLA's cases involved litigation.)
116. Bernstein v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1977) is a good example. The state pointedly
removed the power of local welfare departments to deviate from local rent schedules where the
local agency believed such action was warranted.
117. Judicial review of decisions of administrative agency actions is a principle function of
state and federal courts.
118. The adequacy of the local rent schedules involved in Bernstein, 373 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y.
1977), has been challenged in New York State courts. The plaintiff's complaint has been up-
held and the case is currently being tried in the lower courts. Jiggets v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d
570 (N.Y. 1990).
119. SAMUEL B. BACHARACH & EDWARD J. LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS
AND OUTCoMES 42 (1981). ("[T"he task of a bargaining party is to convince its opponents
that it controls resources ... and that it is willing to use power. These manipulative actions
ultimately determine bargaining power.") See also Avid Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a
Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982).
Since the poor client generally has nothing to lose, the only cost of litigation is the actual
cost of the litigation, a cost which is not the responsibility of the client. Thus, most decisions
not to litigate require a cost benefit analysis by the lawyer rather than the client. This clearly
presents ethical problems which will not be pursued here.
120. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
Many lawsuits.., concern a struggle between a member of a racial minority and a
municipal police department over alleged brutality, or a claim by a worker against a
large corporation .... In these cases, the distribution of financial resources, or the
ability of one party to pass along its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining pro-
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Despite these myriad situations that require litigation and despite
Legal Services Corporation's claim of 1,421,805 closed cases in 1987,121
1,430,053 cases in 1988,122 and about 1,400,000 cases in 1990,123 there
was little reported litigation during those years. The Westlaw data banks
reveal that in 1987 there were 389 state court and 151 federal district
court appearances, for a total of 540 court appearances.12 4 The year
1988 saw a decline to 361 state court and 103 federal district court ap-
pearances, for a total of 464.125 In 1990, while the total number of closed
cases remained constant, there were only 95 appearances in federal dis-
trict court and 273 in state court, for a total of 368126 or about one re-
ported litigated case in every 3,800. The decrease from 1987 to 1990 was
172 or 31.9 percent. The decrease from 1981, when there were 564 state
court and 174 federal district court appearances for a 1981 total of 738
reported appearances, 127 was 370, or just over a 50 percent decrease.
When representing people whose financial position is precarious, lit-
igation is necessary to achieve even modest fiscal gains or to avoid mod-
est financial loss. For example, a welfare department's decision to
"recoup" a small prior overpayment by deducting a small amount from a
family's monthly grant causes hardship. If the decision to recoup is erro-
neous as a matter of law, as is often the case, and negotiation and admin-
istrative procedures fail, litigation would seem to be the only option
consistent with the "zealous" representation called for by the ethical
standards of the profession. 128
cess, and the settlement will be at odds with a conception of justice that seeks to
make the wealth of the parties irrelevant.
See also Julie J. Bisceglia, Comment, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' Liability In-
surance-Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L. REV.
690, 709 (1985) ("Settlements work only if the two bargaining parties are roughly equivalent in
power, and each can credibly threaten the other with a court fight if the settlement does not
materialize.").
121. FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 10.
122. Id.
123. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION 2 (1991).
124. See infra Table 2 and Table 8.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) (describing a case where the
welfare agency conceded during the administrative process). In most instances there is no
concession and litigation is necessary.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981), dealing
with problems arising from funding cutbacks, states:
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility emphasizes duties owed by a
lawyer to existing clients, including a duty of adequate preparation (DR 6-101(A)(2))
and a duty of competent representation (DR 6-101(A)(1) and (3)). Each of these
One sometimes hears that a program does not litigate because of
success in negotiation. A legal services program may argue that a good
relationship with a particular agency's personnel makes litigation
counterproductive and that to preserve a "relationship" with an agency,
a poverty lawyer should consider the "sacrifice" of a "client" for the sake
of future clients.129 Negotiation is a serious business, however, and the
mandatory obligations is applicable to all lawyers, including legal services lawyers.
See ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS 1359 (1976) and 1428 (1979).
... In order to comply with the requirements of DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3), forbid-
ding a lawyer from handling "a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances" and neglecting "a legal matter entrusted to him," it is already recog-
nized that in the face of limited resources, legal services offices must establish priori-
ties for handling matters and accepting new clients. ABA Informal Opinion 1359
(1976).
II. Ethical Obligations of Remaining Lawyers after Funding Cutbacks Have Re-
duced Available Services So Drastically That Existing Clients Cannot Be Served in a
Competent Fashion
Under these circumstances, it is our view that the lawyers remaining in the legal
services office must, with limited exceptions, decline new legal matters and must con-
tinue representation in pending matters only to the extent that the duty of competent,
non-neglectful representation can be fulfilled.
With respect to existing clients of the legal services office, the Committee is of
the opinion that only those matters that can be handled consistent with each lawyer's
duty of competent, non-neglectful representation should be continued. When faced
with a workload that makes it impossible for the remaining lawyers to represent
existing clients competently, legal services lawyers should withdraw from a sufficient
number of matters to permit proper handling of the remaining matters.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359 (Use of Wait-
ing Lists or Priorities by Legal Service Office) (1976) states:
However, in an office with finite resources, failure to institute priorities may limit the
quality although not the quantity of legal aid.
Notwithstanding the argument that fairness and reason are best served by giving
all indigents some although perhaps inadequate legal advice, Formal Opinion 334
requires any limitation be "in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Code
of Professional Responsibility." Disciplinary Rules 6-101(A)(2) and (3) forbid a law-
yer's handling "a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances" or
"neglect[ing] a legal matter entrusted to him." The refusal to set up priorities is
improper if it causes a violation of DR 6-101.
The refusal by directors of legal services offices to establish priorities could re-
sult in Code violations if it causes "inadequate preparation" or "neglect" by a staff
lawyer within the meaning of DR 6-101. A priority system or other caseload limita-
tion may be established if it is a fair and reasonable method of making maximum
legal services available to the indigent and not inconsistent with the Code. The pol-
icy must be established before a staff attorney accepts representation of a particular
client so that the lawyer's judgment regarding the representation in pending matters
will not thereby be affected. See [MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]
EC 5-23, EC 5-24, EC 6-3, EC 6-4.
129. Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37
UCLA L. RaV. 1101, 1147 n.158 (1990).
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likelihood of litigation, its cost and its risks, not personal charm and rela-
tionships, are the factors which determine the benefit of a settlement.13
Melvin Belli, a well-known litigator, once said, "I have to maintain
my advocacy in court on trial in order to keep up my settlement
value." '131 Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the other
party's position, including its ability and willingness to litigate if dissatis-
fied with proposed settlements, is essential to a competent negotiator. 132
When one party to a negotiation concludes litigation will not occur if
that party makes no concessions, then any concessions made are gratui-
tous, and what one calls a "negotiation" is really a supplication.1 33 It
130. Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1808, 1823 n.64
(1986), states:
A mandatory delay of 50 years between filing and trial would not increase settlement
rates. Instead, it probably would reduce these rates substantially. From a purely
economic perspective, an infinite queue would leave a defendant with no reason to
settle (apart, that is, from the prospect that the plaintiff would throw a rock through
his window or otherwise resort to self-help).
See also, Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory ofDelaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469, 505 n.135 (1987). ("The standard economic theory of
litigation posits that lawsuits are brought and not settled when the parties have differing views
on the probable outcome of the case or the probable judgment if the plaintiff prevails.").
131. Melvin M. Belli, Pre-Triah Aid to the New Advocacy, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 34, 44
(1957).
132. Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on "Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco'" Rational
Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. REv. 335, 338 (1989) ("But both also know that
bargaining is risky. In particular, it may convey to the opponent useful information about the
course of any future litigation or about one's willingness to settle.")
133. Id. at 337-38 (after noting that under accepted economic theory each party will settle
if he perceives that the proposed settlement has a greater value than the "expected outcome at
judgement" and that this perception includes "his estimate of the probability of a finding of
liability," adds "each disputant's estimates are strategic, in that they depend importantly on a
prediction of what the opponent will do." Id at 337 n.5).
Assume that claimant C asserts a claim against X. The following possibilities will arise.
1. Institutional policy may prevent X from making any concession. The non-litigator will
never succeed in securing anything for client C.
2. X may believe the suit is entirely without merit. X may make an offer if he expects C
to litigate to save some of the costs of litigation. See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substan-
tive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits--The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review,
71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971). Absent expectation of litigation, no offer will be forthcoming.
Again, the non-litigator obtains less.
3. X believes there is risk of loss should there be litigation, but believes C will not litigate.
X will not make a realistic offer unless and until C does something to change X's perception
because if C will not litigate, X is not at risk. See Alex Waldrop, Enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act: What Role Should the Federal Government Play?, 74 Ky. L.J. 201, 207 (1985-86)
(describing HUD conciliation procedures and noting that when "it is evident that the com-
plainant is unrepresented by counsel, conciliation often collapses. There is no credible threat
of 'consequence' should the respondent refuse to cooperate." (quoting Patricia Harris, Secre-
tary of HUD)). See also Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1458, 1506 (1986) (criticizing the Environmental Protection Agency's negotiated settle-
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follows that the paucity of litigation by legal service programs, despite
the many cases where litigation is called for, makes negotiation a sham
and evidences the absence of quality lawyering. The price paid includes
not only a poor result for the particular client, but less than satisfactory
results in negotiations for other clients.
C. The Data
The data reveal not only appallingly low numbers of reported litiga-
tions, but a snowballing decline in what little litigation took place during
the last three years. To provide the broad picture of what has happened
in the past and is currently happening, I have examined litigation by
legal services programs for the ten-year period 1981-1990, utilizing
Westlaw data banks and assuming the broad scope and depth of the data
would overcome the argument that reported cases are not an accurate
sampling of unreported cases. Problems in interpreting data obtained
from Westlaw and LEXIS data banks have been discussed in the social
science literature. 134 The major concern is whether the outcomes of re-
ments and noting that one cause was "the EPA's inability to maintain a credible enforcement
presence") (citing Jeffery Miller, EPA Superfund Enforcement: The Question Isn't When to
Negotiate and When to Litigate, But How to Do Either and How Often, 13 Entvl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,062, 10,063 (1983)).
4. Same as 3 except X believes C will litigate based on C's reputation or X's experiences
with C. X will make an offer calculated to lead to a settlement without litigation. See Bundy,
supra note 131. The litigating propensities of C result in a substantial offer even where C's
assessment of the case has led C to conclude that the case is not worth litigating or where C does
not wish to chance an adverse judgment Id. at 338. This occurs in situations where C's con-
duct or reputation has caused X to miscalculate.
One common factor in all these scenarios is a lack of perfect information. There are un-
certainties and differing perceptions. But one perceived as weak in terms of ability and propen-
sity to litigate is in an inferior bargaining position, compared to one perceived as strong. Thus
the literature when discussing threatened litigation quite often notes that the threat must be
credible. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1028 (1986) (noting a scenario where "the threat of litigation
will not be credible," adding that the process ends "if the defendant realizes that the plaintiff is
bluffing and will fold his case if the defendant does not pay"); George F. Hammond, Note,
Notification of Breach Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-607(3)(a): A Conflict, a
Resolution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 525, 546 n.121 (1985) ("A highly credible threat [of litiga-
tion] increases the chances of settlement."). This is all a part of strategic behavior, or more
generally, of game theory. See ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRO-
DUCTION To GAME THEORY (1989). See generally MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY (rev.
ed. 1983) (a nontechnical introduction to game theory); ROBERT D. LUCE & HOWARD
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957) (a readable though mathematical introduction to
game theory); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSCAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953) (a complex mathematical discussion of game theory);
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) (business negotiations).
134. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
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ported cases in the federal district court data bank fairly represent the
results of the unreported cases. As this Article deals only with the
number of cases, not their outcomes, this problem is not present. 135 The
data assembled here make, at the very least, a solid prima facie case. The
data are more than sufficient to persuade others that, absent some fairly
persuasive evidence to the contrary, litigation on behalf of the poor com-
munity has disappeared.
Soc'Y REv. 1133 (1990) and the authorities cited therein. The authors do point out that
certain districts, namely New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, publish a higher percentage of
discrimination cases than other districts, and "seem to publish an unusually high share of all
civil cases." Id. at 1144. But the higher percentage mentioned in the article would not affect
this study's conclusions. As a precaution, I examined total cases, class actions, and constitu-
tional cases in the district courts of the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. They are consistent
with the published tables.
135. For example, if a study of reported cases concluded that the defendants in negligence
cases prevailed on the issue of contributory negligence 60% of the time, one would recognize
that judges rarely write opinions affirming jury verdicts or settled cases. They are more likely
to write opinions when they overturn a jury verdict, finding contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law.
Table 1
Urban Legal Services Program's Involvement in Federal Litigation,
1988
Budget 136  Court of District Total Federal
Area (000s) Appeals1 37  Courts138  Litigation
Boston $5,405 13 19 32
New York City 15,360 51 129 180
Philadelphia 6,684 64 75 139
Baltimore 7,924 17 20 37
Atlanta 3,013 5 4 9
Miami 2,714 3 4 7
New Orleans 1,711 6 2 8
Houston 3,474 6 2 8
Birmingham 944 2 4 6
Memphis 1,445 4 2 6
Detroit 3,067 3 4 7
Cincinnati 1,927 9 16 25
Cleveland 4,113 5 9 14
Chicago 6,981 19 52 71
Denver 2,226 10 14 24
Los Angeles 7,744 6 6 12
Oakland 1,950 4 10 14
San Francisco 1,703 2 5 7
Total $78,385 229 377 606
Reported federal court litigations in eighteen representative major
urban areas from 1981 to 1990 are shown in Table 1. Table 1 shows the
extent to which most of the urban programs have shunned the federal
courts. While the district court cases in the Westlaw data bank are only
a portion of district court decisions, and are to a degree dependent on the
decisions of individual judges to submit their opinions for publication,
and while there may be differences in the percentage of opinions reported
136. The budget data in Table 1, as in other tables, is the sum of the amounts attributed to
the various programs for 1988 in Appendix A and Appendix E of the Legal Services
Corporation's FACT BOOK, supra note 21.
137. The circuit court data is that contained in the CTA data bank of Westlaw.
138. The district court data is obtained from the DCTR data bank of Westlaw, which
contains cases reported in the Federal Supplement, Federal Rules of Decision, and the
Bankruptcy Reporter. The Bankruptcy Reporter cases are excluded from these columns,
because the unpublished cases found in other Westlaw data banks are mostly from New York
(311) and Pennsylvania (414). An additional 51 cases come from Kansas, Oregon, Missouri,
and Massachusetts, leaving 49 cases for the other 44 states. Bankruptcy cases are excluded
because, at least for the indigent, they seem to be much simpler than other federal court
litigation, and their inclusion, in the author's view, distorts the data.
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from different parts of the country, 139 these variations do not explain
away the low number of appearances in so many urban programs. More-
over, the defense of an inaccurate sample cannot be made with respect to
court of appeals decisions. The poor performance of many programs in
the district court is mirrored by an equally poor performance in the court
of appeals. A comparison of the performance of these large urban pro-
grams with the clinical programs of four law schools is illuminating.
New York University's clinical program (Washington Square Legal Serv-
ices) during 1981-1990 had twenty-five district court and fifteen court of
appeals appearances. Only New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago's mul-
timillion-dollar programs had more appearances. Yale's program had
twenty district court and twelve court of appeals appearances, out-
performed by only four urban. programs."4 Brooklyn Law School's
clinic had twelve district court and eight court of appeals citations, out-
performing eleven of our major cities.' 1 Finally, the clinic operated by
the University of Chicago's law school appeared nine times in district
court and had seven circuit court appearances, outperforming the pro-
grams of eleven major cities. 42 The cumulative totals of these law
school clinics, sixty-six district court and forty-two court of appeals ap-
pearances, is 16 percent of the cumulative totals of the eighteen urban
programs.
Table 2
State Appellate Cases, 1981-1990
Legal Aid
Year Services' 43  Legal Services Total
1981 118 446 564
1982 110 346 456
1983 90 312 402
1984 103 275 378
1985 99 304 403
1986 83 314 397
1987 93 296 389
1988 70 291 361
1989 94 250 344
1990 64 209 273
139. See supra note 134.
140. See Table 1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Because legal aid'societies often represent indigent criminal defendants, screening out
criminal cases required separate treatment of those organizations.
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Many commentators, including the author, have suggested in-
creased civil litigation in state courts. 1" To expand our picture and to
see if there was simply a shift from one court system to another, we
looked at the number of state appellate cases in which all legal services
programs were involved during the past ten years. Table 2 reveals that
legal services programs in 1981 appeared in 564 state appellate cases, the
number declining to 273 in 1990. This confirms the consistent and accel-
erating decline in legal services program involvement in major litigation.
Table 3
Class Actions, 1981-1990
Federal District Court State Appellate Court
Year Total Legal Services Total Legal Services
1981 538 80 376 24
1982 552 75 341 19
1983 569 69 389 18
1984 513 95 361 11
1985 532 74 340 10
1986 548 60 319 16
1987 479 65 357 22
1988 481 50 308 16
1989 426 45 296 14
1990 425 42 324 7
We turn to examine class actions, an accepted indicia of aggressive
and substantive litigation. 145 As Table 3 indicates, during a period when
the total number of federal district court class actions fell from 538 to
425 or 21 percent, the number of legal services appearances declined
from a range of 74 to 95 in 1981-1985, an average of 78.6 annually, to a
range of 65 to 42, an average of 51.6 during 1986-1990, or 34.2 percent
and in 1989-1990, to 45 and 42 cases, or a decline of 44.8 percent. Total
class actions in state appellate courts declined from 376 cases in 1981 to
324 cases in 1990, a decline of 14.3 percent. During 1981-1985, legal
services programs appeared in 16.4 cases a year, declining to fifteen cases
a year during the years 1986-1990. This decline is in line with the overall
figures, but the number of cases in 1989 and 1990, fourteen and seven,
show a marked and accelerating decline.
144. See Redlich, supra note 114, at 58.
145. But see Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. RE'V. 1183
(1982); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 344-51 (1988).
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Table 4
Legal Services Program Involvement in Constitutional Law District
Court, 1981-1990
Year Total Legal Services
1981 1147 85
1982 1208 87
1983 1221 62
1984 1236 61
1985 1210 64
1986 1290 65
1987 1255 63
1988 1243 47
1989 1206 44
1990 1177 48
The number of legal services programs' appearances in federal dis-
trict court in cases raising due process or equal protection issues aver-
aged 71.8 per year during 1981-1985, and dropped to an average of 53.4
cases per year during 1986-1990. The major drop occurred during 1988-
1990 when appearances were below fifty each year. During the same
period, the number of these cases brought by all parties showed no appre-
ciable change.
Table. 5
Class Action Constitutional Law District Court, 1981-1990
Year Total Legal Services
1981 193 37
1982 219 40
1983 175 31
1984 168 33
1985 178 36
1986 180 37
1987 148 24
1988 141 17
1989 117 18
1990 113 17
Tracing the incidence of class actions involving constitutional law
issues over the period reveals a decrease somewhat larger than the de-
crease in the total number of these cases. This may be explained by a
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very large number of similar cases relegated to the DCTU data bank, '
very few of which were taken by legal services programs. 147
Table 6
Statewide Program's, 1981-1990
Budget Court of District
State (OOs) Appeals Court Total
Indiana $3,226 10 8 18
Iowa 2,821 10 7 17
Maine 1,873 6 38 44
Alaska 3,154 17 11 28
Washington 5,670 9 15 24
Oregon 3,125 8 13 21
Montana 1,203 9 6 15
Total $21,072 69 98 167
To determine if the problem was confined to urban legal services
programs, other types of programs were examined over the ten-year pe-
riod. Table 6 establishes that statewide programs with funds approxi-
mating 26 percent of the urban budget made 27.5 percent as many
federal court appearances as did the sample of urban areas. There was a
far greater degree of uniformity in program importance. Perhaps of
greater importance, there was no single program with the litigation rec-
ord of Community Legal Services of Philadelphia to prop up the per-
formance of these programs. A transfer of that program's $6,684,000
budget to the statewide programs would result in a cumulative budget of
$27,765,000 as compared to an adjusted urban budget total of
$71,700,000. Transfer of its 180 federal court appearances would result
in a total of 347 appearances, compared to the remaining 426 federal
court appearances of the other urban programs or 80 percent as many at
less than 40 percent of the cost!
146. The DCTU data bank contains cases that are not published in the Federal Supple-
ment, the Federal Rules of Decision, or the Bankruptcy Reporter.
147. The DCTU data bank contained 389 cases during the 10 year period, most from 1985
to 1990. During those six years, the numbers ranged from 44 in 1985 to 74 in 1990. During
the 10 years, legal services programs were involved in 21 cases, five in 1986, four in 1987, and
three per year in 1988-1990.
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Table 7
Wide-Area Programs
Budget Court of District
Program 148  (000s) Appeals Court Total
Nassau/Suffolk $2,704 8 13 21
Prairie State 2,920 6 4 10
Legal Action Wis. 2,423 10 12 22
Legal Servs. Ala. 5,029 41 25 65
Tex. Rural 1,473 27 18 45
Fla. Rural 3,126 14 22 36
Central Ohio 1,543 0 00 00
Colo. Rural 1,701 9 11 20
Cal. Rural 5,805 6 14 20
Total $27,724 121 119 240
Table 7 presents a similar compilation of data concerning nine pro-
grams that covered large geographic areas. With 34 percent of the urban
funding, wide-area programs appeared in federal court 39 percent as
often. Once again, there was greater consistency; once again, there is no
Community Legal Services of Philadelphia to soften the poor perform-
ance of these programs.
Table 8
Total District Court Civil Cases, 1981-1990
Total District
Year Court Cases14 9  Legal Services
1981 4,896 174
1982 5,118 161
1983 5,420 168
1984 5,842 178
1985 6,165 151
1986 6,340 136
1987 6,391 151
1988 6,323 103
1989 6,124 99
1990 5,909 95
148. Nassau/Suffolk Law Services Committee (N.Y.); Prairie State Legal Services (Ill);
Legal Action of Wisconsin; Legal Services Corporation of Alabama; Texas Rural Legal Aid;
Florida Rural Legal Services; Central Ohio Legal Aid Society; Colorado Rural Legal Services;
California Rural Legal Assistance.
149. This data bank consists of cases printed in the Federal Supplement, Federal Rules of
Decision, and Bankruptcy Reporter.
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The number of appearances in federal district court rose very
slightly between 1981 and 1984 and then began a precipitous decline in
1985, accelerating in 1988. The number of appearances in 1990 is the
lowest in twenty years. The lowest number of published cases had been
105 in 1971.150
D. Assessment of Data
Usually one attempts to explain one's findings and to construct a
model to cure what the numbers reveal. The findings above were predict-
able both from the observations of the programs in operation, and from
simple logic. The years of fiscal neglect and political attacks have taken
their toll. Just as the cause is apparent, so the model already exists. The
most successful of all legal services programs is Community Legal Serv-
ices of Philadelphia, whose 139 federal court appearances compares with
467 appearances by the other seventeen urban programs. Funded at
$6,684,000 or 9.3 percent of the funds available to those programs, Com-
munity Legal Services made 29 percent as many appearances in federal
court! Its sixty-four court of appeals citations exceed the cumulative ap-
pearances by legal services programs in Houston (six), New Orleans
(six), Atlanta (four), Miami (three), Los Angeles (five), Memphis (four),
San Francisco (two), Detroit (three), Cleveland (six), Cincinnati (nine),
Oakland (one), and Denver (ten). The cases handled by Community
Legal Services dealt with the interpretation of state and federal statutes
and regulations,':" preemption by federal law of state statutes,152 inter-
pretation of the bankruptcy laws,1 53 nonacquiescence by the Social Se-
curity Administration of the law of the circuit, " 4 challenge to eviction of
tenants from property forfeited to the United States under drug stat-
utes,"55 the validity of liens under state and federal statutes,"5 6 and the
validity of certain welfare practices.157 Many of the cases influenced
practices that affected or could affect significant numbers of persons.
150. If bankruptcy court appearances are eliminated, the picture is even darker. During
1981-1983, there were a total of nine bankruptcy court appearances. Despite the significantly
lower number of cases during 1988-1990, the number of bankruptcy court appearances rose to
30, or 10 per year.
151. In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421 (3rd Cir. 1989) (dealing with bankruptcy laws);
Robinson v. Block, 869 F.2d 202 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Food Stamp Act).
152. Ayers v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 902 F.2d 1184 (3rd Cir. 1990); Smith v. Fidelity
Consumers Discount Co., 848 F.2d 907 (3rd Cir. 1990).
153. McLean v. Philadelphia Water Revenue, 891 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir. 1989).
154. In re Sullivan, 904 F.2d 886 (3rd Cir. 1990).
155. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34 (3rd Cir. 1990).
156. Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1989).
157. Bennett v. White, 865 F.2d 1395 (3rd Cir. 1989).
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Last year, the program celebrated two victories in the Supreme Court,15 8
one of which, Sullivan v. Zebley,' 59 involved more money than any case
in legal services' history, dwarfing Morris v. Williams1" and Rosado v.
Wyman,"' which cost California and New York hundreds of millions of
dollars. The New York Times162 estimated that $2.5 to $3.5 billion would
go to the hundreds of thousands of disabled children affected by this class
action lawsuit in the next five years. The Washington Post 163 predicted
the cost would reach $7 billion. Only the much publicized Texacol"
case rivaled Zebley, and Texaco was eventually settled for far less than
the judgment. 165
Community Legal Services' most conspicuous characteristic, other
than its successes, is its wealth of experienced and talented litigators,
many of whom had appeared in federal court for the program before
1980. Seventeen different program lawyers were involved in federal liti-
gation in 1988-1990 alone.16 6 From this, two conclusions can be drawn.
First, major litigation can be undertaken by urban legal services pro-
grams. Second, the presence of experienced litigators can turn younger
lawyers into litigators. 167
III. Proposals for Change
A solution to the problems of poor communities' need for represen-
tation in future constitutional litigations is not simple. The legal needs of
the poor can never be met in full, 168 but it is apparent today, as it was in
1965, that resources must be available for litigations that can bring
change, however those litigations are described. But finding resources is
not a simple task.
158. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Daven-
port, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
159. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
160. 433 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1967).
161. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
162. More Poor Children Eligible for Disability Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at A8.
163. Spencer Rich, Freeing Aid to Disabled Youngsters; New Rules May Help Tens of
Thousands, WASH. POST, December 17, 1990, at A9.
164. Pennzoil v. Texaco, 401 U.S. 1 (1987).
165. The case was settled for $3 billion. In re Texaco Inc., 84 B.R. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
166. The most prominent are Jonathan M. Stein, Richard P. Weishaupt, and David A.
Searles.
167. I spoke with the program's director, who agreed with my conclusion, and when asked
about caseload, noted that the program's attorneys were unionized and that their contract
authorized attorneys who felt they could not take new cases to request a panel decision if the
administration disagreed. When caseload requires, the program declines to take clients, mak-
ing referrals to the local bar if possible.
168. See Breger, supra note 2, at 362.
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One cause of the problem is the structure of legal services. Legal
services litigators whose time is not occupied by ongoing and planned
litigation must return to performing service functions. 169 The size of
most legal services programs inhibits the formation of "law reform" units
within particular programs. Another factor is that creating a specialized
unit to handle the "big case" influences many aspects of a legal services
program's structure and manner of operations. The initial problem is
staffing the new unit. In the abstract, one selects the best people. Practi-
cally, this may mean raiding local offices for their best lawyers. In a
sense, it is a message to those not chosen that serious litigation is no
longer their responsibility. The staff attorney feels confined to low level
work, and lawyers who will not be involved in litigating impact cases
may not search for them. Dynamics tend to create a staff hierarchy and
elitism with all its pitfalls.17
A. Utilization of Available Resources
Quality lawyering, in the course of dealing with clients, uncovers
cases that could result in social change. This does not mean that each
program should or could be so structured as to have the capacity to liti-
gate, by itself, all the cases it discovers. An essential component of the
major constitutional litigations that took place during the "war against
poverty" was the Backup Center. The best known and most effective of
these institutions was the Columbia Law School-based Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law, founded by Edward Sparer, whose successor,
Lee A. Albert, was in charge of the Center in 1969 when numerous wel-
fare-related litigations were commenced or were en route to the Supreme
Court. Some cases like Rothstein v. Wyman171 were relatively simple.
All that was required was the drafting of a complaint, marshalling of
necessary evidentiary materials, taking of depositions, preparation of mo-
tion papers and supporting documentation, and preparation of briefs and
memoranda of law on complicated constitutional issues. For even a mid-
169. A good example was Carl J. Nathanson, Nassau County's premier litigator. He ar-
gued Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), an important case involving jurisdiction before
the Supreme Court as well as Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 409 U.S. 75 (1972). He
also handled several cases before New York's highest tribunal and, by my count, 38 "service"
litigations, winning 27. No case or client was more important than any other. As memory
serves, he declined the opportunity to handle Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F.Supp. 339 (S.D.
N.Y. 1969), vacated, 398 U.S. 275 (1970) because of the needs of his other clients (which, in
passing, is how I got to be a "constitutional" lawyer).
170. See George, supra note 88, at 711 ("Development of sufficient expertise within each
legal services project was not the answer, for it would ... have forced dramatic cutbacks in the
caseload-something LSP could ill-afford.").
171. 303 F.Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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size program, finding attorney time to do all of these tasks would be diffi-
cult. Having a resource with extremely talented lawyers to do the brief-
ing and legal research was invaluable, both in terms of time and the
quality of work presented to the court. There are also cases that last the
better part of a decade and require a long-term commitment of costly
resources. 72 Finally, cases like Rosado v. Wyman 73 are resource-intense
and compressed into a short time frame. 74 The ability of the Center to
engage in this type of litigation is even more remarkable considering its
other activities during the same period. Goldberg v. Kelly 75 was en route
to the Supreme Court, and the Center was also engaged in numerous
172. In Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-3314, 1991 WL 65530 (E.D. Pa.), Community Legal
Services' fees were set at $550,000 in a Stipulation of Settlement approved by the court. Koster
v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1990) was commenced in 1982; see Koster v. Webb, 598
F.Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) sustaining the complaint and Koster v. Perales, 108 F.R.D. 46
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) granting class certification. The litigation ended when Nassau County and
New York State stipulated that they would begin to provide shelter to the homeless when they
applied, instead of telling them to return at a future date. The Nassau/Suffolk Law Services
Committee, Sullivan & Cromwell, and O'Melveny & Meyers were awarded $326,678 in attor-
ney's fees. In the earlier district court proceedings, plaintiffs were represented only by Nas-
sau/ Suffolk Law Services and by Robert Hayes representing the Coalition for the Homeless.
173. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
174. This history begins on March 31, 1969, and continues until the end of June of that
year. It omits the dates of some oral arguments, court appearances, and a myriad of minor
procedural matters that did not result in official court action. All matters were thoroughly
briefed. The complex substantive and jurisdictional issues in Rosado are mentioned in note 82.
March 31 - New York enacts statute effective July 1, 1969.
April 24 - Judge Jack B. Weinstein issues a temporary restraining order and re-
quests convocation of a three-judge district court to determine constitutional issues
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
May 9 - Three-judge court takes testimony and hears motions for summary
judgment.
May 9 - Governor signs law amending statute, mooting constitutional issue.
May 12 - Three-judge court dissolves, case returned to Judge Weinstein who issues
temporary restraining order, preventing state from implementing statute.
May 15 - Judge Weinstein issues preliminary injunction based on the statutory
claim and denies state application for stay.
May 21 - Second Circuit grants preference to appeal from preliminary injunction
and denies state application for stay.
June 4 - Appeal argued before Second Circuit.
June 11 - Second Circuit stays preliminary injunction pending disposition of appeal.
June 16 - Second Circuit denies plaintiffs' motion to vacate stay and denies state
application to stay district court proceedings.
June 16 - Plaintiffs (1) file appeal to the Supreme Court from the order dissolving
the three-judge court, (2) petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari before
judgment, and (3) ask the Supreme Court to vacate stay of preliminary injunction.
June 18 - Judge Weinstein grants summary judgment for plaintiffs and issues per-
manent injunction, stay is denied.
June 19 - Second Circuit stays permanent injunction.
June 24 - Supreme Court dismisses appeal from order dissolving three-judge court,
denies petition for certiorari before judgment, and declines to vacate Second Circuit
stays.
175. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
[Vol. 19.745
LITIGATION FOR THE POOR
other litigations including Jefferson v. Hackney,176 and Wyman v.
James. 1
77
But expecting the centers to play a major part in oncoming constitu-
tional litigation is unrealistic, as the Legal Services Corporation, fright-
ened by earlier opposition to the centers, 178 sharply limited their
resources and downplayed their role. The sixteen backup centers, now
called National Support Centers, received a total of $7,129,943 in 1988
from the Corporation. Although the LSC notes that they have com-
pleted 30,493 requests for service, 179 it acknowledges that "services rang-
ing from brief phone advice to complex litigation were weighed
equally."1 80 In any event, during the past ten years, support centers have
been involved in seventy-six reported federal cases as compared to 137 in
the years prior to 1981.
The centers are only one of the resources available to assist legal
services programs with major litigation. Among the other entities avail-
able are law school clinical programs, public interest law firms-some
closely associated with particular interest groups, some not-and major
law firms. Indeed, in the New York City area there is considerable inter-
action between all of these entities. Outside of New York there is some
but far from enough. Law schools and law firms ought to be encouraged
to lend support to legal services programs conducting major litigations.
For the major law firm, this uses its talents in an effective manner. For
the law student who needs to develop writing and drafting skills, it pro-
vides a useful educational experience, more meaningful than interviewing
clients.181
What is needed is an organization with the resources, the ability,
and the prestige to direct pro bono activities in the direction of major
litigation and act as a clearinghouse so that law firms and law schools
willing to contribute their skills are matched with legal services programs
in need of such assistance. That organization is the American Bar Asso-
176. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
177. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
178. The "Green Amendment," added to the Legal Corporation Act, allowed the Corpora-
tion to undertake backup center functions "but not by grant or contract." While the sole
explicit purpose of the Amendment was, in the words of Congresswoman Green, "to stop the
research and advocacy in the backup centers. . ." and "to get rid of the backup centers," 119
CONG. REc. 20,717 (1973), the Corporation retained the power to fund backup centers and did
so. For a detailed account of backup centers from their origination until the mid 1970s, see
George, supra note 88, at 709-20.
179. FAcT BOOK, supra note 21, at 61.
180. Id. at 57.
181. At the Albany Law School, the Disabilities Clinic, which involves students in a wide
range of litigations, is perceived by many as the school's best clinical experience.
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ciation.'1 2 In a sense, I suggest a national referral service, but it can be
more. Just as the ABA directly or indirectly funds research in various
areas, so can it gather and distribute funds voluntarily contributed by
those members of the bar who support this type of activity. This kind of
voluntary bar involvement in major litigation on behalf of the poor
makes far more sense than proposals for mandatory pro bono programs
that are both flawed and poorly received by many of the same lawyers
who would assist the program suggested here. The structure for this
kind of activity already exists. The ABA Private Bar Involvement Pro-
ject has for many years encouraged law firms to place attorneys with
legal services programs. But for the most part, this activity has been
misdirected. Using the resources of major law firms to assist in legal
services programs' day-to-day service activities is well meaning but
hardly an effective use of what in military terms would be termed "elite
forces" that should not be consigned to trench warfare. With the grow-
ing prospect of mandatory pro bono programs facing us,1 3 recall Robert
Moses, the "planner" who devised and built Long Island's traffic-con-
gested highways. The Moses' solution to traffic congestion was never
mass transportation, or building parking facilities near the railroads lead-
ing to the city, or extending the subway system to where it could be
utilized by residents of the Island. Instead, it was always to build an-
other lane, or another highway, or in his last years, another expressway.
This always made the traffic congestion worse, because the new roadway
made the trip to New York City a bit quicker; so, as a result, housing
development was encouraged further and further out on the Island, lead-
ing city residents who had used the city's mass transport facilities, to
drive, usually into Manhattan Island, whose road system could not be
enlarged and whose parking facilities were overwhelmed. One result was
182. Yolande Prevost, a first-year law student, suggested to me that the American Bar
Association should take a leadership role in test litigation in view of the political problems in
securing adequate federal funding for this type of activity. Her idea was the genesis of this
proposal.
183. See COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES FINAL RE-
PORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1990); Barlow F. Christensen,
The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3 n.5; ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION ON PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL SERVICES (1975); AssOCI-
ATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER'S
PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS, TOWARD A MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE
PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER 11 (1980); Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Histori-
cal and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (1981); Joseph L. Tortes & Mil-
dred R. Stansky, In Support of a Mandatory Public Service Obligation. 29 EMORY L.J. 997
(1980); cf David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
735 (1990).
LITIGATION FOR THE POOR
a new word, "gridlock." '184 Mandatorypro bono activities of the bar will
have the same effect if they follow the wrong Moses. If thousands of
compulsory volunteers appear at legal services offices to handle service
cases, there will always be enough clients to greet them. There will also
be gridlock in our lower civil courts, or at least they will have to undergo
massive and costly expansion. The quality of justice will not be en-
hanced. 8 The initial determination that the poor's need for lawyers can
never be met because it is so vast, was correct in 1965 and still is, due to
the increased number of poor, the deterioration of their housing, the
elimination of employment opportunities by technology, and the inevita-
ble disruption of more and more families by economic pressures. 18 6 The
solution is to utilize the resources of the bar wisely, not thoughtlessly.
B. Improving Structure
Positive steps that the Legal Services Corporation can take are to
renew its demands that programs consolidate and to eliminate programs
whose small size and location make them both expensive and ineffectual.
For example, upstate New York is a model of structural inefficiency.
Seventeen mostly very small separate programs dot the upstate New
York horizon, each with its own Director and Board of Directors. Some
are rationally placed in upstate urban areas, while others are scattered
almost randomly. A rational consolidation would permit economies of
scale, the freedom to adjust to changing patterns of needs, and presuma-
bly improved legal services to the poor in the area.
New York is not unique. There are 113 programs funded by the
Corporation with grants of less than $500,000117 whose fiscal worth is
questionable. 188
184. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF
NEW YORK (1974). The Moses era ended as a result of his attempt to build a bridge over
Long Island Sound, and divert traffic into Southern Connecticut and Westchester County.
Moses ignored those who suggested that truck traffic from New England would use the bridge
to attempt to avoid New York City. His undoing was not based on his refusal to consider
alternatives like mass transportation. Rather, it was his 'egalitarian' insistence that the exten-
sive approaches to the bridge were to be built in the most prestigious portion of Nassau
County's "North Shore" which would have destroyed some of the most affluent "bedroom"
communities in America, where many of the partners and clients of New York City's major
law firms resided.
185. See Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I
Had a Public Defender, YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION, Spring 1971, at 4.
186. See Edelman, supra note 14,
187. FACT BOOK, supra note 21, Appendix A.
188. There were 113 programs funded by Legal Services Corporation for less than
$500,000. Id The total Legal Services Corporation funding was $33,724,000. These pro-
grams received from other sources an additional $21,271,000 for a total of $54,995,000. See id.
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C. Rewards and Sanctions
Rather than watch the disintegration of local legal services pro-
grams and their level of performance at all levels, the Legal Services Cor-
poration should insist that local programs meet certain goals. But one
does not "order" quality. A grantor can, however, insist that attempts be
made to bring entering salaries into line with those of state governments
over a period of a few years, and induce compliance by offering to pro-
vide matching funds. A similar approach can improve the status of se-
nior staff, modernization of office equipment, structural changes to aid
efficiency, and formation of interorganizational relationships with other
legal services programs and public interest organizations. And finally,
significant victories such as Sullivan v. Zebley8 9 could be publicly ac-
knowledged by the Legal Services Corporation as a component of its goal
of "equal access to justice."
D. Evaluations
Legal Services Corporation can also have competent and knowl-
edgeable persons make field audits and evaluations of its grantees. It
would be foolish to request a return to the "war against poverty" era
when program ideology and dedication to "law reform" was allegedly
one of the components of the Office of Economic Opportunity's annual
evaluations.190 Scrutiny of ideology by the Legal Services Corporation
today, divided in its perspectives, would not be desirable.
Conclusion
In a quarter century we have almost come full circle, from a frugally
funded handful of local legal aid attorneys unable to provide real services
to their clients to a massive national program that is rapidly becoming
equally ineffectual. Reversing the trend to assure competent legal repre-
Appendix J. Sixty-three of these programs made no federal court appearances during 1981-
1990. Thus, 63 programs have not found a client whose legal needs required resort to the
federal courts. My studies show that another 11 found one such client in a decade, and 14
more programs found two such clients. The Empress Catherine, could she view the scene,
would appreciate today's Potemkin's villages-now called "equal access to justice." Of course,
Potemkin did not lavish huge amounts of funds year after year on his make-believe villages.
Nor did he convince himself that they were real.
189. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
190. The author evaluated numerous programs in the Northeast in the late 1960s. Most of
the evaluation was non-ideological, directed at competence as perceived by all levels of the
community, including the local bar, judiciary, local government, community leaders, members
of the Board of Directors, staff, and clients. Despite about a score of such evaluations, I en-
countered none where ideology was a determinant of a recommendation to reward or sanction
a program.
sentation in all areas, including the necessary demands for constitutional
change, will involve serious political and fiscal problems and tensions.
No goal other than the provision of quality services is ethically appropri-
ate,19 1 nor would any formulation other than increased-quality aid in
performing either the "service" mission or handling future constitutional
or other major impact litigation be ethically acceptable. But today, it
would be myopic to articulate these demands. Under the fabric of "equal
access to justice" we must, on behalf of our adopted constituents, de-
mand movement - slow, patient movement in the direction of quality.
While I wish, and my students demand, an immediate return to a golden
era, I truly fear that such demands, while justified, are untimely and
would today be counterproductive.
The accumulated data is sorry enough, but one unemphasized fact is
that the deficiencies in legal services are acquiring momentum. While I
have concentrated on a ten-year period, every chart that has year-by-year
data shows vastly decreased involvement during the years 1988-1990.
191. For a comprehensive analysis resulting in this conclusion, see Gary Bellow & Jeanne
Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Prac-
tice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337, 354-57 (1978). Referring to the impulse to "help" all clients the
authors state:
Implicit in this position is the notion that a publicly financed lawyer cannot or should
not turn away anyone in need and that under representation is preferable to attempts
to find criteria for deciding who will not be served. In its most extreme form, this
may mean: (1) permitting caseloads to rise, usually without any conscious choice
being made by the attorney; (2) providing routine, minimal service, primarily ori-
ented to defusing crises; (3) trading off affirmative actions or claims-often without a
careful assessment of their worth-for "time" or a long-term payment schedule; (4)
not informing clients of the minimum level of service they are receiving... and (5)
making no effort to bring to the client's attention legal matters on which the client
has not requested assistance ....
Despite our sympathy with this desire to help... nothing in the Code sanctions
such conduct. In fact, it would be hard to find a set of practices so flatly in violation
of its provisions.
The authors note that Canon 6 obligates attorneys to provide competent representation,
adding, "DR 6-101 (2) and (3) provide that a lawyer should not 'handle a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances. . . .' A recent Committee opinion squarely sup-
ports this position ... stat[ing] 'the refusal by directors of legal services offices to establish
priorities could result in Code violations if it causes 'inadequate preparation' or 'neglect by a
staff lawyer... ." Id. at 356 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1359 (1976)).
The authors also believe that Canon 5, which requires lawyers to exercise "independent
professional judgment," is violated when caseload overwhelms an office, as is Canon 7's obliga-
tion of loyalty to a client. Finally they cite Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Com-
mitment, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 805, 813 n.14 (1971) ("glossing over injustice, even in the best of
motives, perpetuates it."). See ABA Standards for Providers of Civil Legal Services to the
Poor, Standard 6.1 (1986), which the ABA has interpreted (ABA Formal Opinion 334) as
permitting limitation of services to a client "only to an extent and in a manner consistent with
the requirements of the Code .... "
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Organizations, like human beings, have endurance based on intangibles.
But organizations, like human beings, can take only so many insults
before they expire. I sense in the accelerated decline, old age or perhaps
a speeded-up version of "the one horse shay." If something is not done
to restore sustenance to the body of legal services, the soul, passionate as
it is, may no longer be willing to continue a desperate battle.
